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The International Monetary Fund places great importance on 
monetary policy in its programmes for developing countries in sub-
Saharan Africa. It regards such policy as crucial to holding down 
inflation and stabilising the real exchange rate. But such an approach 
is absurdly inappropriate since the vast majority of governments of 
sub-Saharan countries lack the instruments to make monetary policy 
effective (see Weeks 2010). 
Implementing monetary policy can use two channels: 1) trying to 
influence the creation of private credit through so-called open market 
operations or 2) seeking to influence the borrowing rates for the private 
sector by adjusting the interest rate at which commercial banks can 
borrow from the central bank.
Open market operations, namely, the buying and selling of government 
securities, require a domestic bond market that can support substantial 
trading of securities. If there is no such market, then the central bank 
has to resort to adjusting its policy interest rate in the hope that it can 
influence lending by commercial banks to the private sector. Such a 
hope is based on the assumption that commercial bank credit plays a 
substantial role in financing private investment.
 
Hence, the effectiveness of monetary policy relies on a viable domestic 
market for trading public securities and a commercial banking sector 
willing and able to lend to the private sector. However, with the 
exception of South Africa, no country in the sub-Saharan region has 
these necessary conditions. 
Securities Markets
For over a third of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa, monetary 
policy is obviously irrelevant because they share a common currency. 
Thus, they have no national central banks. The West African Economic 
and Monetary Union has eight members and the Central African 
Economic and Monetary Community has seven more. All 14 use the CFA 
(Communauté Financière Africaine) franc.  
To these 14 countries can be added another three: Lesotho, Namibia 
and Swaziland. Their membership in the Common Monetary Area 
(CMA) means that their currencies are tied de facto to the South African 
Rand (see Figure 1). The CFA governments cannot even go through the 
motions of monetary policy (since they have no central banks), and the 
CMA national central banks lack operational independence.
Sixteen additional countries do not issue public bonds or have no 
domestic market for such securities. Another 11 countries have 
domestic markets for public bonds but these markets are extremely 
shallow (Figure 1). In all of the countries mentioned above, except 
South Africa, the only potential purchasers of public bonds are a few 
expatriate banks, typically no more than four or five, which dominate 
the financial sector.
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With the exception of South Africa, there are few statistics available 
on trading volumes in sub-Saharan bond markets. However, relevant 
information for Zambia, which has one of the more developed financial 
sectors in the region, reveals the characteristic problems of domestic 
bond markets in the region (Weeks et al. 2006). 
The Lack of Domestic Credit
The Zambian experience demonstrates that if the yield on public 
securities is low, commercial banks would hold only the statutory 
required minimum in their reserves. So central banks have to offer a high 
yield to induce commercial banks to hold government bonds. Since such 
bonds are almost risk-free, commercial banks are much more inclined to 
hold them as assets than riskier loans to non-financial businesses. These 
factors reinforce the already existing reluctance of commercial banks to 
finance productive private investment because of the perceived risks of 
doing so. 
Raising the interest rate on government securities can further 
discourage commercial banks from lending to the private sector through 
the following process. In response to a weakening of the exchange rate 
or a perception that inflationary pressures are excessive (or both), the 
central bank would most likely increase the interest rate on government 
bonds. 
In most sub-Saharan countries the demand by commercial banks for 
bonds does not readily respond to changes in the interest rate. One 
reason is that there is little competitiveness in domestic bond markets 
and another is that the bonds of African governments have extremely 
low credit ratings from Standard and Poor’s or Moody’s—if they are 
rated at all. 
Given these factors, the main impact of the central bank’s raising of the 








Figure 1: Distribution of 45 African Countries by Bond Markets
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to the private sector with government bonds because the relative return 
from the former has fallen. This is a perverse result because when bonds 
increase the assets of commercial banks, they should expand their 
creation of credit. But because of the high yields received by banks on 
government securities, it is profitable for them to hold excess reserves 
instead of lending.  
This process is fundamentally different from the so-called ‘crowding 
out’ of private investment, about which the IMF repeatedly warns 
national policymakers. But the ultimate effect is the same. ‘Crowding 
out’ allegedly occurs when government borrowing to cover public 
expenditures competes with private borrowing. The dynamic that we 
are describing is different because the increase in the central bank 
rate does not originate from a need to cover public expenditure, but 
from the false expectation that the higher rate would appreciate the 
exchange rate and reduce inflationary pressure. 
Though raising the central bank interest rate is usually intended to 
reduce the weakening of the exchange rate by inducing more capital 
inflows, such investment rarely increases in response to a such a hike.  
A major reason is that domestic bond markets in the region lack the 
institutional mechanisms to facilitate and safeguard foreign capital 
flows.  
The fundamental problem is centred in the financial sector itself. Even if 
the policy interest rate of the central bank could influence commercial 
lending rates and thereby reduce credit expansion, credit from the 
banking system is of relatively little importance in most sub-Saharan 
countries (see Figure 2).
Across 46 African countries, the median ratio of domestic formal-sector 
credit to GDP was only 13% during 2001-2008. Only two countries 
(Mauritius and South Africa) had ratios above 50%. And only six had 
ratios above 30%.  For 20 of the 46 countries the ratio was less than 10%.
 
The Rise of Public Debt
In summary, the reality in sub-Saharan Africa is that, with very few 
exceptions, monetary policy has no meaningful impact on inflation 
or the real exchange rate. But monetary policy that is committed to 
maintaining high real rates of interest does have adverse consequences 
since the burden of public debt is determined overwhelmingly by the 
interest rate at which it must be serviced. 
Thus, the IMF’s lobbying for inflation-retarding high real rates of interest 
ends up reinforcing the diversion of public funds into debt servicing. 
And the main beneficiaries are a few large and powerful domestic 
commercial banks. 
In the process, one of the fundamental rules of debt management—
namely, that the real interest rate on public debt should not exceed 
the real growth rate of the economy—is violated. As a result of such a 
fiscal burden, the country’s rate of economic growth is unnecessarily 
constrained, without having achieved any mitigating benefits through 
lowering inflation and maintaining a competitive exchange rate. 
Sources:
Basic information on monetary institutions: Wharton Financial Institutions Center of the 
University of Pennsylvania, for all but Mauritius, Namibia, Nigeria and Seychelles, and http://
www.afdb.org/en/news-events/article/donor-workshop-on-african-bond-market-4443 
For information on financial statistics: World Development Indicators, 
http://publications.worldbank.org/ 
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Figure 2: Domestic Credit Extended to the Private Sector 
in 46 African Countries (% of GDP, average 2001-2008) 
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